Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962-63

Mingjiang Li

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Published online: 27 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Mingjiang Li (2011) Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962-63, Cold War History, 11:3, 387-419

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2010.498822

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Mingjiang Li
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

This paper uses new archival and other documents in analysing the interactions between Chinese domestic politics and international politics and the impacts on Sino-Soviet relations from early 1962 to July 1963. The article proposes a more coherent theoretical approach to the study of the Sino-Soviet split and in particular the role of ideology during the split. This paper concludes that the dynamics of an ideological dilemma were in full play during this period. Mao, the paramount leader in the Chinese political system, intentionally linked his foreign and internal political ideological struggles and, to a large extent, manipulated and escalated Sino-Soviet ideological disputes for his domestic political purposes, namely pushing for his domestic radical programs, asserting his own ideological supremacy, and perhaps most importantly, checking the power and influence of his political rivals.

The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was unmistakably one of the most significant events during the Cold War era. Why did the Sino-Soviet alliance, hailed by its creators as ‘unbreakable’ and ‘eternal’ ‘brotherly solidarity’,¹ break up and the bilateral relations eventually evolve into open hostility and military confrontations in the 1960s? This question has fascinated and perplexed generations of scholars. With the publication of a few books in the past decade, we are now in a better position to understand and explain the origins of the Sino-Soviet split. But at the same time, new questions and puzzles have also emerged. The scholarly debate on this issue is still unabated.²

Among the few major approaches to the study of the Sino-Soviet rupture, realist/neo-realist theory emphasises different national interests between Beijing and Moscow.³ While able to account for some of the specific events, this approach fails to provide a convincing explanation for the whole picture. A commonsensical
observation that the policy of opposing both superpowers harmed China’s national security renders the realist paradigm largely inapplicable. Other scholars examine the ideological differences between the two communist parties. By ideological differences, they refer to the different interpretations of orthodox Marxism and Leninism by the two parties and this paper follows that definition. This perspective is helpful in elucidating the general pattern of bilateral relations, but it does not explain the changing intensities of disputes and confrontations at different historical times, nor does it address the origins of the ideological differences between the two parties. Moreover, it does not explain why China was willing to engage with France in 1964 and later with the United States even though the ideological discrepancies between China and these two countries were obviously much greater than the ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow. According to this approach, Mao is often described as an ideological dogmatist. However, for most of his lifetime, Mao was a very pragmatic political leader and it was his pragmatism that made the victory of the Chinese communist revolution possible.

Others argue that the rupture was largely due to the ambition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (particularly Mao) to compete for leadership in the international communist movement. But as we know now, much of the contention for allies and sympathisers in the socialist bloc and the third world took place after the split became a reality. In addition, some scholars stress idiosyncratic conflicts between Mao and Khrushchev. The two leaders truly were in conflict when it came to personalities, yet they were able to get along with each other before 1958, and although Khrushchev stepped down in 1964, Sino-Soviet conflicts deepened further and plunged into open hostility and military confrontations by the end of the decade.

Some scholars study the Sino-Soviet rupture from a structural approach. The main argument in this school of thought is that the political relations between Moscow and other socialist countries were based on various Leninist party doctrines that stressed hierarchical authority, discipline, and even obedience. This rigid structure could hardly tolerate the existence of major differences in national interests, national policies, ideological interpretations, and even personalities between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and other communist parties. When differences emerged, political tensions in the socialist world would be inevitable. This structural approach makes more sense as compared to other schools of thought because it has the capacity to incorporate a multiplicity of variables, even all the factors discussed above. The shortcoming in this approach, however, is that it treats those differences as given. It fails to give sufficient weight to human agency. It does not explain why on numerous occasions differences within the socialist camp were relatively smoothly hammered out.

In recent years, scholars, particularly from China, have devoted much attention to China’s domestic politics with good results. Lüthi, in his book the Sino-Soviet Split, explicitly argues that the Sino-Soviet split had to do with the domestic politics in China, particularly Mao’s manipulation of the ideological differences between the two communist parties. This paper, using new materials found at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives and other documents, builds on this line of research and attempts to
propose a more coherent theoretical approach to the study of the Sino-Soviet split and shed new light on the CCP’s internal assessments of Sino-Soviet relations. It seeks to better explain the causal mechanisms between China’s domestic politics and Beijing’s Soviet policy. This study focuses on the period from 1962 to July 1963 because this was the most crucial era in the Sino-Soviet split. Having experienced severe disputes in 1959 and 1960, the two communist parties apparently attempted to play down their quarrels and stabilise the bilateral ties at the Moscow Conference in late 1960. From late 1960 to early 1962, there was no further deterioration in bilateral relations. However, from the summer of 1962 relations began to turn sour, and in July 1963 the talks between the two parties – the last major effort to salvage bilateral ties – failed. Subsequently, the two parties engaged in a vehement ideological polemic that eventually made the split irreversible.

This study reveals that an ideological dilemma was in play during the process of the Sino-Soviet split. When ideological differences exist between two countries, political leaders in one country are likely to regard the ideological and political orientation of the other country as a challenge and even a threat to their own domestic ideological and political programmes and goals. Any move that one side makes to defend its ideological and political position would be perceived by the other as a threat to the legitimacy of its own domestic political line and would invite criticism from the other side. Any step that the other side takes to either counter-argue or employ punitive actions against its rival would beget counter-measures. A vicious circle is thus formed, very similar to the functions of the security dilemma in general international relations. The ideological dilemma could further aggravate the bilateral relations if there is domestic leadership competition and rivalry. Factions in either country would be strongly tempted to use the ideological differences with the other country for their own domestic political purposes. This paper, while mainly focusing on the Chinese side of the story, concludes that the dynamics of this ideological dilemma were well demonstrated in the case of the Sino-Soviet split. During the period under study, Mao, the paramount leader in the Chinese political system, intentionally linked his foreign and internal political ideological struggles and, to a large extent, manipulated and escalated Sino-Soviet ideological disputes for his domestic political purposes, namely pushing for his radical domestic programmes, asserting his own ideological supremacy, and, perhaps most importantly, checking the power and influence of his political rivals.

This paper develops the argument in five main parts. In the first section, I review Beijing’s moderate Soviet policy in the aftermath of the tragic failures of the Great Leap Forward between late 1960 and the summer of 1962. In the second section, I describe the Chinese efforts at stabilising and improving Sino-Soviet relations in the first half of 1962. I then analyse the dramatic turn to the left in China’s domestic politics in the second half of 1962 and the impact on China’s soviet policy. In the fourth section, I describe the further radicalisation of China’s domestic politics. The fifth section discusses the Sino-Soviet interactions in the early months of 1963 and the failed party-to-party talks in the summer of that year.
Domestic difficulties and moderation in foreign affairs

The year 1960 was significant for the Sino-Soviet alliance in many ways. In the first part of 1960, veiled mutual criticisms in the media, the struggle between the two parties at the Bucharest meeting, and the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China not only revealed their differences to fraternal parties and socialist countries but also rendered the Sino-Soviet dispute an open secret in the West. However, both sides tried to refrain from escalating the conflicts and attempted to downplay their differences in late 1960. Over the subsequent two years, bilateral relations were more or less stabilised. Beijing’s moderation was attributable to domestic socio-economic difficulties that resulted from the horrendous failures of the Great Leap Forward. The Chinese leadership, to some extent including Mao, was willing to put ideological differences aside temporarily and focus on domestic readjustment and reconstruction. For instance, China signed a civil trade agreement with Japan in November 1960 and gradually resumed the trade relations that had been suspended in 1958. The Chinese leaders even considered the possibility of signing an agreement with Washington to import food from the United States.

In Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing also began to practise moderation. At the 9th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in January 1961, the CCP leadership decided to stop polemics with the Soviets in favour of a policy of relaxation towards Moscow and to improve relations with neighbouring countries. New initiatives were taken to enhance Sino-Soviet cooperation in defence and security. In early 1961, radio communications between the Soviet Pacific fleet and China’s East Sea fleet were resumed. In May 1961, the Soviets attempted to invite Lin Biao, the Chinese Defence Minister, and Luo Ruiqing, the PLA Chief of General Staff, to visit the Soviet Union and promised to allow the Chinese leaders to see many new Soviet military technologies. Moscow also decided to transfer advanced military technology to China, such as equipment for producing the MiG-21 fighter jets.

A telegraph sent by the Chinese embassy in Moscow on 4 January 1961 stated that the tone in Soviet media evaluation of China’s foreign relations had never been so positive compared to the recent past. Beijing must have been happy to see the positive attitude of the CPSU. In Mao’s words, since the Soviets were returning to friendship, ‘we should also take some steps’. On 3 February 1961, the CCP instructed that the 11th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty should be celebrated on a larger scale. The Chinese Foreign Ministry followed up with an additional notice to all provincial leaders urging them to personally take actions on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the alliance treaty and the Chinese New Year in order to strengthen the friendship and unity with socialist countries.

In the context of positive interactions, the bilateral ties again looked more cooperative. The Soviets voluntarily proposed to provide China with 1 million tons of grain and 50,000 tons of sugar. Further, Beijing and Moscow signed a new trade agreement in April 1961. The Chinese delegation to the trade negotiations reported that the negotiations with the Soviet Union went relatively smoothly. Although there
were some disputes, the final agreement largely reflected Chinese views, especially on some of the major arrangements in bilateral trade.\textsuperscript{20} Despite the fact that the Chinese leadership had a very negative assessment of the Soviet 22nd Party Congress in October, believing that Khrushchev had four targets of criticism in the Congress: Stalin, the anti-Party clique, Albania, and China, Beijing decided that 'we should try our very best to avoid split, at least try our best to delay the split . . . . We will just hold on [to him] shamelessly and not split.'\textsuperscript{21} Obviously, because of the retrenchment policies in China since 1960 and the relatively stable relationships among the CCP leadership, the ideological dilemma between China and the Soviet Union was not a very salient issue until the second half of 1962.

A big challenge in Sino-Soviet relations was the Albanian issue.\textsuperscript{22} China’s implicit moral support for Albania prior to and during the Soviet 22nd Congress was not without negative consequences. A late 1961 telegraph that the Chinese embassy sent to Beijing noted that since China’s National Day and the Soviet 22nd Party Congress, there had been very little news coverage of China in the Soviet media. The Soviets also significantly reduced the staging of Chinese films. In another telegraph dated 4 December 1961, Chinese diplomats in Moscow reported that Soviet media indirectly increased criticism of China’s support to Albania and China’s domestic political economy and foreign policy. The document mentioned that, between the Soviet 22nd Party Congress and 4 December, on a total of six occasions the Soviet official newspapers and magazines reprinted or published opinion pieces that attacked China without mentioning China or the CCP.\textsuperscript{23} In another cable, dated 14 February 1962, the Chinese embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviets had significantly scaled down the celebration of the 12th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, citing the level of Soviet leadership participation in various activities, grassroots activities, and the volume of Soviet media reports. The cable particularly pointed out that no Soviet speech or report mentioned Mao Zedong and commented that this lapse was rather unusual as compared to past years.\textsuperscript{24}

**Chinese efforts to stabilise and improve Sino-Soviet relations**

The Sino-Soviet dispute over Albania had the potential to significantly push the bilateral ties into a deteriorating trajectory. It was perhaps due to concerns about the domestic difficulties and further deterioration of relations with Moscow that, in the early months of 1962, many Chinese leaders began to be worried and take action to further strengthen Sino-Soviet unity. In public, Liu Shaoqi supported Mao’s assertions of revolutionary diplomacy, but he also emphasised to his colleagues that, in order to fulfil China’s international obligations, the first priority had to be doing well domestically.\textsuperscript{25} Other leaders shared Liu’s belief. Peng Zhen, who attended the Soviet 22nd Congress together with Zhou Enlai, served as head of the Chinese delegation after Zhou left for home. In a private conversation with Liu Xiao, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Peng instructed the ambassador to work harder to promote friendship between the two countries, telling him that, although the two parties were
engaged in intense quarrels, state-to-state relations should be friendly, and efforts should be made to reduce tension and improve bilateral ties. In April 1962, Zhou Enlai instructed the State Science and Technology Commission to be active and take the initiative to handle scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries properly.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi was one of the proponents of better Sino-Soviet relations. In a private conversation with Ambassador Liu Xiao, who had just come back from Moscow, Chen concluded with a sincere tone that efforts should be made to maintain a certain level of relations with the Soviet Union and strive for improvement. On 16 February 1962, Chen made a long speech before senior foreign ministry officials. While critical of the Soviet leadership, the overall tone of Chen’s speech was to encourage moderation in China’s relations with the Soviet Union. Chen characterised Sino-Soviet relations as ‘sometimes tense and sometimes relaxed’ and concluded that this pattern was not going to change any time soon. However, he urged his colleagues to be proactive in consolidating unity with the Soviets and admonished them: ‘Now struggle [with the Soviets] has become the mainstream. [We need to think about] whether we should practise self-restraint. Not practising self-restraint is not good for us’. Chen used the CCP’s growth and benefits during the periods of cooperation with the KMT, the CCP’s erstwhile political adversary, to justify his argument, saying that cooperation with the Soviets would also benefit China. Chen noted that the People’s Daily and Red Flag magazine had published some articles critical of the Soviet Union and suggested that the Chinese press should also practise self-restraint and not be too aggressive in criticising the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Chen indicated that China should not protect and side with Albania at all costs. He suggested that Albania had its own problems in managing relations with other socialist countries. He also criticised the Chinese official media for not mentioning peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and solving problems through dialogue. Chen told his subordinates that Huang Yanpei, a well-known non-CCP political leader, had commended him for having twice mentioned ‘under the leadership of Khrushchev’ in his speech at the Soviet embassy’s reception honouring the 12th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. At the end of his speech at the Foreign Ministry, Chen told his staff that China’s relations with the Soviet Union had to be maintained at a certain level and efforts should be made to improve the bilateral relationship. He noted that China would need the Soviet Union, given the current domestic difficulties in China, and that, even in two to three years when China’s domestic situation was projected to improve, China would still need to maintain reasonable relations with the Soviet Union. Chen’s speech clearly indicated the divergent views among the Chinese leadership. The dividing line largely existed between those in charge of ideology and propaganda and other leaders positioned to implement the socio-economic and foreign policies. Although Chen never made clear what he really meant by ‘reasonable level’ of cooperation with Moscow, he quite obviously preferred some kind of bilateral relationship better than the situation that was evident in early 1962.
In February and March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent two cables to Chinese diplomatic missions and provincial leaders instructing them how to handle Sino-Soviet relations. The February policy paper was sent one day after Chen’s long speech at the Foreign Ministry. The March document unmistakably criticised various Chinese actions as being too aggressive and unrestrained. Three major categories of mistakes are listed. First, after the Soviet 22nd Congress some regions and organisations passed on relevant instructions and educational materials from the CCP Central Committee to people who were not supposed to receive such information. Some ill-judged remarks were made and some slogans were critical of Moscow. Second, the document charged that some comrades did not have a correct and proper understanding of the boundary of the struggle. Third, some comrades intentionally displayed a dislike towards people from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia and, therefore, did not engage with them in friendly activities. Some even intentionally started the polemic to provoke them.

In light of these flaws and shortcomings, the document provided very detailed instructions on how to curb the unbridled expansion of the campaign of opposing modern revisionism and to improve Sino-Soviet relations. For example, the document demanded Chinese diplomats and local leaders not to make any mention of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Communist Party, or Khrushchev in various political education programmes targeting the ordinary cadres and the masses. It further stated that except the CCP Central Committee and those departments, diplomatic missions, and personnel authorised by it, all other departments and comrades were not to engage themselves in the struggle with the Soviet Union. The document strongly urged all Chinese missions overseas to maintain normal relationships with the Soviet Union, Eastern European socialist countries, and Mongolia, and to attempt to consolidate unity and friendship with them. The paper also stated that in drafting internal documents, wherever the opposition to modern revisionism was concerned, no linkage was to be made between revisionism and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Communist Party, or Khrushchev. These two policy documents suggest that those moderate Chinese leaders were not only contemplating and talking about a new policy towards Moscow, but began to implement a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union.

The most outspoken Chinese leader who attempted to push for an alternative international strategy was Wang Jiaxiang, the head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department. In early 1962, encouraged by support from Liu Shaoqi, Wang presented a report to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi in which he argued that China should try to create a peaceful environment for its domestic economic development, ease tensions in China’s external relations, and consider China’s real capacity in giving foreign aid. The fact that Wang did not submit the report to Mao, the actual decision-maker on China’s international strategies, indicates the subtly different strategic considerations between other leaders and Mao. Against the official Chinese position, Wang argued that peaceful coexistence was possible even between socialist countries and capitalist countries and that China should do everything possible to strive for peace.
In line with his analyses of the overall situation, Wang proposed some concrete policy suggestions, including downplaying ideological differences with the Soviets, easing tensions with the Indians, and reducing material aid to other revolutionary movements. At the suggestion of Wang, China adopted a conciliatory policy at the World Peace Congress held in July in Moscow, based on the possibility of comprehensive disarmament, a policy that was appreciated by the Soviets. The World Peace Council, an organisation under strong Soviet influence, even proposed to grant a gold medal to the Chinese delegation. According to the recollection of a senior official during the Mao era, the Chinese delegation’s conciliatory behaviour in Moscow was endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. In the early months of 1962, the CCP even endorsed a proposal for another international conference among fraternal parties to mediate the disputes between the Soviet Union and Albania and to consolidate the unity in the socialist camp. However, the proposal was not acted upon because Moscow insisted that it had not committed any mistake that would be akin to great power chauvinism. Again, it is worthwhile to note that these moderate proposals and policies were possible largely because the impact of the ideological dilemma that had been evident in much of 1960 was significantly mitigated.

The left turn in China’s domestic politics

On the domestic front, the economic difficulties and the need for retrenchment policies as a result of the disastrous Great Leap Forward allowed Liu, Deng, and other pragmatic leaders to take direct responsibility for the retrenchment policies. To Mao’s outrage, Liu and Deng tried to reverse almost all his previous policies, guiding China on a course completely contrary to his vision. The new actions and proposals regarding China’s Soviet policy as described above took place in this context. Toward the second half of 1962, Mao realised that the retrenchment had gradually eroded the foundations of his radical programmes and diminished his political authority.

The political resolve of the pragmatic leaders to rectify the Great Leap Forward came from their full realisation of the disastrous consequences of that programme. Liu, for instance, metaphorically commented in June 1960 that the errors accounted for only one finger out of ten, but in the future they could be two fingers or three fingers. In April 1961, Liu went back to his home town and investigated what really happened in China’s rural areas. He eventually came to realise the full extent of the famine and the real source of the catastrophe. Mao believed otherwise. He argued in January 1961, at the 9th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, that the problems in the rural areas were caused by the sabotage by class enemies. To solve the problems, there would have to be socialist education in the countryside and an elimination of the former landlord class. Mao’s call for class struggle in the countryside was largely ignored by other leaders who were personally in charge of famine relief and economic adjustment.

In September 1961, Mao argued that the economic recession had hit the bottom and could only improve from that point on, but other leaders maintained that the Chinese economy was far from recovering. In late 1961, Mao made clear his opposition to the
practice of rural household responsibility fields, a practice to which he had actually lent sporadic support. During the 7000-cadre conference in early 1962, Mao and his colleagues had drastically different views on the Great Leap Forward and its negative consequences. Liu Shaoqi, the leader of the de facto first-line leadership, unequivocally pointed out that the difficulties were 70% man-made and 30% caused by natural calamities. But the general line of the Great Leap was reaffirmed. In February, at the Xilou conference, Liu presented an even bleaker picture and continued to warn that the national economy was on the brink of collapse. Zhou agreed with Liu's assessment, saying, ‘The current financial and economic difficulties are very serious. In addition, there may be other difficulties that we have not seen or are unable to predict’. He added that ‘in the next ten years there should be a period of recovery’.

Furthermore, during the Central Work Conference in May and June, Liu said in his concluding speech that we had many flaws and mistakes in implementing the general line, organizing the people's communes, and conducting the Great Leap Forward, even grave flaws and mistakes . . . . The peasants starved for a couple of years . . . . Some people died . . . . I think it is high time that we look back to examine and draw lessons. We can no longer continue to go on like this.

In the spring and summer, private farming and household contracting spread further across China, largely because of peasants’ initiatives and local cadres’ tacit encouragement. With the support of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, Liu adopted many moderate economic policies that, in essence, effectively eliminated Mao’s policy framework that had been in force since 1958. After thorough investigations, many leaders – including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Deng Zihui, and Mao’s secretary Tian Jiaying – began to propose official support for the household responsibility practice. The growth of private farming and other top leaders’ support for this practice made Mao very angry, and he severely scolded some of the leaders.

Liu and his supporters’ adjustment was not limited to the economic area. Taking advantage of their position at the front line of leadership, they actively pushed for relaxation in many other fields as well. They rehabilitated many cadres that had been wrongly punished in the anti-rightist movement. Peng Dehuai, the former Defence Minister who was purged in the summer of 1959 for criticising Mao’s radical policies, wrote a long letter asking for rehabilitation. Liu and others also relaxed the political and ideological atmosphere and allowed greater room for Chinese intellectuals in their creative works. ‘Politics in command’, meaning mass political mobilisations for economic activities, a core value of Mao’s radicalism and his guideline of the Great Leap Forward, was, to a large extent, ignored.

All these readjustments, in Mao’s eyes, as he later acknowledged, were alarming signs that prompted him to suspect that revisionism was emerging at the central level. Mao was not without political capital. As a symbol of Chinese communism, he still enjoyed an enormous amount of authority and respect among party officials at all levels as well as among the people; thus, an enraged Mao started to fight back.
Mao disagreed with other leaders’ bleak assessment of the socio-economic situation. He did admit that there were problems but believed that the appraisal was too pessimistic. According to the reflection of Wang Guangmei, Liu’s wife, in the summer of 1962, an upset Mao confronted Liu in a private conversation. He scolded Liu: ‘[W]hat are you worried about? [You] can’t stand firm and resist now? Why can’t [you] hold on? ... [At] Xilou [conference], it was described as completely dark .... [T]he three red flags have been negated, [and] land has been divided up. You can’t withstand? What can [you] do after I die?’ Liu replied emotionally: ‘So many people have starved to death. History will write about you and me. [The occurrences of] cannibalism will be recorded in books!’

During the Beidaihe conference from 6 August to late August, the Central Work Conference, and the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee (including the preparatory meeting of the Plenum from 26 August to 23 September and the formal meeting of 24–27 September), Mao explicitly criticised the new developments in China’s political economy. Mao proclaimed that there had been three ‘winds’ in much of 1962: the darkness wind, the private farming wind, and the verdict reversal wind. Mao claimed that the emergence of these three winds indicated that class struggle was still an important task in China. He criticised other leaders’ pessimistic evaluation of the situation, saying that he had toured many parts of the country and had been told by regional leaders that the situation was getting better: ‘It looks like it’s not all dark at all. Some comrades estimated the situation [as being] excessively dark.’ He went on to say, ‘In the past two years, talking about darkness was valid, [but] talking about brightness was invalid,’ and ‘[some people] say the agricultural recovery needs as long as five or eight years; then there is no hope.’

Mao also severely criticised the rural household responsibility practice or, in his own words, the private farming wind. Mao warned, ‘[P]rivate farming will inevitably cause polarisation; polarisation will happen not in two years, but in just one year,’ and ‘[e]ven Khrushchev dared not openly disband the collective farms.’ Further, he noted, ‘[s]ome comrades begin to vacillate as soon as there are warning signs. That shows [they] are not mentally prepared for the socialist revolution or do not have Marxism.’ He also criticised Deng Zihui, head of the Party’s rural work department, as a ‘capitalist agricultural expert’. Mao said that cadres at all levels should receive further education, otherwise the revolution would end up in capitalism and revisionism.

Mao single-handedly steered the conferences to talk about class contradictions in a socialist society, declaring,

We can now affirm that classes do exist in socialist countries and that class struggle undoubtedly exists .... In our country we must come to grasp, understand and study this problem really thoroughly. We must acknowledge that classes will continue to exist for a long time. We must also acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes. We must raise our vigilance and properly educate our youth as well as the cadres, the masses and the middle-and basic-level cadres.
Thereafter, Liu made a self-criticism at the 10th Plenum, and Mao, to some extent, excused Liu, but his trust of Liu significantly diminished as compared to the years before 1962.  

The paramount Chinese leader would not talk about the class struggle in China alone but, instead, linked it to the situation in the Soviet Union and used the Soviet Union as a negative example to present his arguments: the Soviet Union had been in existence for several decades, but it was still revisionist and serving international capitalism. In reality, it was counter-revolutionary. The capitalist class could be reborn because that was how it was in the Soviet Union.  

Mao also commented on Sino-Soviet contentions: ‘At the Bucharest Conference in 1960 they tried to encircle and annihilate us . . . . We spent the whole [of] 1960 fighting Khrushchev.’  

On 24 September, Mao said,  

I think that right-wing opportunism in China should be renamed: it should be called Chinese revisionism. The two months’ conference at Beidaihe and Beijing has been concerned with problems of two different kinds. One kind was the problem of political work; the other was the problem of class struggle -- that is to say, the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. The problem of work is also the problem of struggle against bourgeois ideas, which is identical with the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.  

The Communique of the 10th Plenum concluded that ‘imperialists, reactionaries of various countries, and modern revisionists mocked the temporary difficulties our people have encountered, relentlessly attacked our country’s general line of socialist construction, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes, and performed a big and raucous anti-China concert.’  

Mao's political and ideological attacks in the summer again increased the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union and also stirred up political contentions among the CCP leadership. Moreover, in Mao’s mind, opposing Soviet revisionism and thwarting domestic revisionist emergence had become two sides of the same coin. Mao’s accusation that the Soviet Union was moving towards ideological revisionism was largely based on Soviet international policy that was drastically different from Mao’s preferences. He also regarded the relaxation in the Soviet domestic political atmosphere (e.g. less emphasis on class distinctions) and economic incentives as signs of capitalist restoration. What really prompted Mao to label the CPSU as a revisionist party was the functioning of the ideological dilemma. Mao clearly sensed the challenge of the Soviet political and ideological programmes to his own radical Stalinist policies in China. Moreover, the Soviet leadership has always been critical of Mao's radical political agenda. Therefore, Mao's exaggeration of the growth of capitalism in the Soviet Union and his merciless denunciation of it were intended to defend the legitimacy and correctness of his radicalism.  

It is not surprising, then, that the 10th Plenum also witnessed the beginning of criticism of Wang Jiaxiang’s views on the international situation and China’s foreign policy. In August 1962, when Mao heard that the World Peace Council had considered awarding the Chinese delegation a gold medal and that the Korean delegation had
expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese behaviour, he became quite upset and harshly criticised Wang Jiaxiang. Wang’s views were called ‘three reconciliations and one reduction’, referring to reconciliation with imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries and reduced assistance for other revolutionary movements in the world. Mao wrote on a briefing carrying the criticism of Wang’s views: ‘worth reading, very good’. From that point on, Mao would continue to criticise Wang’s views up until the Cultural Revolution.

Mao’s talks at the Beidaihe conference and the 10th Plenum clearly reshaped the political atmosphere in China’s foreign policy circle. The efforts in the first half of 1962 to stabilise and improve Sino-Soviet relations gave way to a much harsher posture toward Moscow. This stance is clearly reflected in the few long cables that the Chinese embassy in Moscow sent back to Beijing. A telegraph dated 14 August 1962 concludes that, under the influence of pacifist propaganda, welfare programmes, the all-people party and all-people state, bourgeois ideas became more active, society became disorderly, and imperialist infiltration in the Soviet society intensified. On Soviet–China policy, the report concludes that Moscow had become more deceptive and hypocritical, as seen in the Soviet intention to maintain unity with China apparently for the purpose of obtaining political gains, restricting China’s influence, obscuring right and wrong, and dividing the leftist forces in the international communist movement. The cable argues that the Soviets were doing all these to buy time and consolidate their own position to launch a new and much fiercer struggle with China and suggests that China should make use of the advantageous situation and adopt flexible conflict tactics and implement a class policy of consolidating the leftist faction, attempting to win over the middle, and isolating the rightist faction.

Mao’s rhetoric of class struggle also obviously had an impact on Chinese nationals living in the Soviet Union. On 14 August 1962, the Soviet Foreign Ministry lodged a serious protest against China and charged that some Chinese students and researchers in various Soviet institutes had openly challenged and criticised the Soviet Party and the resolution of the 22nd Congress. Another long cable sent back by the Chinese embassy in Moscow, dated 10 September 1962, predicts that Moscow would attempt to improve relations with the United States and seek to reach at least partial agreements with Washington on such issues as nuclear testing and non-proliferation. It argues that Moscow would ‘attempt to put further pressure on China to weaken China’s influence’ and suggests that the temporary stability in the Soviet Union would be short-lived because, when it started to capitulate to the US, growing imperialist infiltration and growing tensions in the struggles between the two lines in the international communist movement would entail the further development of struggles and contradictions within the Soviet Union. Given the fact that many senior leaders in the foreign policy circles had advocated détente with Moscow a few months ago, it was very likely that the Chinese diplomats were simply bending with the political wind inside China. No matter what their intention was, it was quite certain that these telegraphs, received during the Beidaihe and the Plenum, provided the ‘evidence’ that Mao needed and reinforced Mao’s strong argument on class struggles.
It is worth noting that during these series of CCP meetings in August and September the Chinese leadership did not highlight the exodus of thousands of Chinese nationals in Xinjiang into Soviet territory in the previous months. Despite the back-and-forth diplomatic tussles, the Xinjiang incident ‘was mainly resolved through diplomatic channels, and at least before November of that year, did not lead to a dramatic deterioration of the situation along the border with the Soviet Union, nor was it a major factor for the later deterioration in relations between the two countries’. A new study concludes that the exodus had its direct origin in the deteriorating economic situation in the locality and the Soviet policy of tacit support was also a contributing factor. Chinese leaders were probably well aware of the profound economic reason behind the massive exodus because similar large-scale emigrations also took place in some regions adjacent to Hong Kong.

However, it is interesting to note how the CCP leaders used this incident for domestic purposes. In handling the incident, the CCP Central Committee instructed local governments to seize the opportunity to expel all Soviet nationals in China and even provided detailed instructions on how to expel them under different circumstances, apparently in an effort to further reduce Soviet influence in China. Beijing disbanded associations of Soviet nationals in various border provinces, including Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang, closed the Soviet consulates in Yili and Urumqi, and launched a diplomatic offensive against the Soviets. The CCP leadership concluded that the Soviet revisionist subversion in Xinjiang was a bad thing, but at the same time it was also useful to expose the ‘ugly face of the revisionists’ and to educate Chinese cadres and masses. Local governments in Xinjiang essentially utilised the handling of the exodus incident to carry out various counter-revisionism educational programmes at the grassroots level so as to obliterate the superstition and blind faith in the Soviet Union among some of the cadres and masses.

Subsequent official analyses of the Soviet Union continued to follow the political line of the 10th Plenum. Another paper, dated 8 October, sent by the Chinese embassy in Moscow, describes the Soviet two-pronged approach to China: discreet serious struggles while simultaneously displaying a friendly posture. The report notes that, in various diplomatic activities, the Soviet leadership had attempted to show friendship towards China and Chinese diplomats in Moscow and concludes that all these positive developments in Soviet China policy were due to the growing domestic problems in the Soviet Union. On 24 October, at the request of the leadership in Beijing, the Chinese embassy sent back another long cable in preparation for the upcoming Central Foreign Affairs meeting. This cable notes that, since the Soviet 22nd Congress, Moscow had faced an international and domestic situation that was more challenging than any in previous years. The Soviet pursuit of compromise with Washington had not yielded a very positive result, and the US was still pressurising the Soviet Union. With the emerging split in the international communist movement, orthodox Marxist and Leninist forces were gaining strength, and efforts in counter-revisionism were gaining ground. In the Soviet Union, revisionist economic policies had resulted in many problems for the
people and the state. The cable predicts that the Soviet leadership would have to concentrate on domestic issues and, thus, intended to reduce tensions and contradictions in their foreign relations. On the domestic front, Moscow would continue to carry out its revisionist political and economic policies, which were likely to be resisted by certain elements in the system. Thus, in the Soviet Union, there was contention between the two factions.

The cable posits that Chinese efforts in struggling with Soviet revisionism had clearly taught Moscow a lesson that China could not be outwitted. China's efforts since the Soviet 22nd Party Congress and particularly the moves in the summer of 1962 had dealt Moscow a major blow and put it in an extremely defensive and awkward position. For that reason, Khrushchev repeatedly emphasised unity with China and called for a restoration of relations to those before 1958. However, Khrushchev's real intention was to obscure principles and right and wrong, divide the leftist forces, attempt to win over the middle, and ultimately prevent counter-revisionism from growing further. By doing so, Khrushchev intended to buy time and accumulate political capital to initiate a new round of contention with China. All these possibilities indicate that modern revisionism had become more malicious, deceptive, and hypocritical and the cause of counter-revisionism had become more complicated and a long-term enterprise. The cable suggests that China should pursue a dual strategy towards the Soviet Union: support and unity on counter-imperialism and resolute resistance and counter-attack against Soviet dissociation and anti-China actions. Even on issues of counter-imperialism and unity, China should attempt to uphold its own principled positions and disclose Soviet deception and hypocrisy. By describing the Soviet leadership as deceitful and hypocritical, Chinese diplomats in Moscow either truly failed to understand Khrushchev's genuine intention to improve relations or simply catered to the political atmosphere that was developing in Beijing. In any case, it is clear indication that in a bilateral relationship clouded by an ideological dilemma it is difficult for one side to reciprocate the positive intentions of the other and it is easy to perceive one's adversary in negative terms.

According to instructions issued by the Central Propaganda Department, the Commission for Foreign Cultural Exchanges, and the Foreign Ministry, China decided to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution lavishly, in accordance with the situation in the international class struggle, to revive the tradition of the October Revolution, and to publicise Marxism and Leninism. The media section was to emphasise the implications and significance of the October Revolution and hold high the banner of revolution, the banner of internationalism, the banner of counter-imperialism and peace, the banner of Marxism and Leninism. In publicising Soviet achievements, the media was to devote certain space and broadcasting time to discuss the Soviet achievements in general terms but downplay its achievements in recent years. In speeches and media articles in general, there was to be no mention of thanking the Soviets for assistance to China, acknowledging Soviet support for China's sovereign and territorial integrity, and no mention of learning from the Soviet Union.
While Mao pushed for radicalism in China’s domestic and foreign politics, Khrushchev was hoping to improve relations with China. Moscow attempted to utilise China’s National Day celebrations to mend fences with China. According to cables from the Chinese embassy in Moscow, the Soviets ‘purposefully demonstrated their friendly postures’. The Soviet press increased reporting of Chinese affairs, even Mao’s activities and remarks, and did not directly or indirectly attack China. Moscow also attempted to avoid contentious issues and refrained from being provocative. The Soviets even began to treat Chinese military students better.63 In October 1962, when the Chinese ambassador Liu Xiao was about to retire from his position and return to China, the Soviets held a grand farewell dinner party for him. To Liu’s surprise, all CPSU Politburo members who were in Moscow at that time attended the party. Khrushchev made a long speech, in which he vowed to take whatever means necessary to improve relations with China. He told the Chinese ambassador that the two sides should write off all their previous differences and polemics and start a new page in Sino-Soviet relations. Kozlov and Kosygin also made similar speeches.64 In his meeting with Liu the day before, Khrushchev had repeatedly and emphatically noted that he would attempt to do everything possible to restore bilateral relations to their level before 1958.65

During the Sino-Indian border war in October and November, Moscow largely supported the Chinese position.66 Khrushchev himself admitted that Beijing’s handling of the conflict with India was justified ‘because India has taken an incorrect position in the recent period’.67 Beijing later firmly believed that Khrushchev’s support was due to his pragmatic need for China’s support on the Cuban missile issue.68 But a declassified Chinese document containing minutes of Khrushchev–Liu conversations does not support Liu’s reflection in his memoir that Khrushchev had told him about the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. What Khrushchev actually told Liu was that Moscow was providing weapons and other material aid to the Cubans. He also briefed Liu on the provocations by US planes and warships of Soviet vessels in the waters near Cuba.69 Interestingly, the Chinese believed that Khrushchev’s pragmatism was a symptom of his revisionism.70

The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations clearly had a lot to do with Mao’s intention to use Soviet revisionism as a negative example for his domestic campaign in order to correct the ideological and political degeneration he perceived. If Mao could concur with other leaders on the goal of maintaining some kind of relations with the Soviets, he ostensibly had no intention of improving the relationship. His mind began to focus on practising what he had said in early 1962 at the 7000-cadre conference: ‘Regarding the bad people and bad things in the Soviet Union and the Soviet revisionists, we should treat [them] as negative teachers and draw lessons from them’.71 Mao’s mindset and political acumen clearly demonstrated the functioning of the ideological dilemma on the part of China. On 5 January 1963, in a meeting with a Japanese Communist Party leader, Mao commented that ‘[W]e have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and [we] are two countries in the socialist camp.
But Sino-Soviet relations are not even as good as the relations between China and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party.\(^\text{72}\)

**The socialist education movement: the growth of domestic political radicalism**

To curb the tendency of domestic revisionism, Mao decided to launch a massive political campaign nationwide, the Socialist Education Movement. Mao wanted to use this campaign to prevent and oppose revisionism in China, and he regarded the movement as a crucial struggle for the fate of the Party and the state.

Soon after the 10th Plenum, Mao conducted an inspection tour of 11 provinces. To his disappointment, his call for attention to class struggles and a socialist education movement among Chinese peasants had not been well received by regional leaders. Only Party leaders in Hunan and Hebei provinces mentioned this matter in their reports to Mao.\(^\text{73}\) Party leaders in Jiangsu province clearly felt that Mao's call for radical political movements in the rural areas would again harm the newly recovered rural economy, so they tactfully resisted.\(^\text{74}\) Mao decided he had to make further efforts to speed up the process. In the February Central Work Conference, despite the fact that the meeting had been planned to discuss socio-economic policies, Mao single-handedly chose to emphasise the political movement in the countryside. When Liu was making a report on 25 February on the Party's struggles with the Soviet modern revisionists, Mao interrupted:

> On [the possibility] of whether or not revisionism will emerge in our country, one [answer] is yes and the other is no. Now some cadres can be bribed over when offered half a kilogram of pork or several packs of cigarettes. Carrying out a socialist education movement in the countryside can dig out roots of revisionism.\(^\text{75}\)

This interruption clearly shows that Mao's mind was primarily on the domestic political situation. The international efforts against revisionism were part of Mao's whole programme of steering the nation's political economy toward his own vision.\(^\text{76}\)

At the meeting, Mao proposed to officially carry out a Socialist Education Movement in China's countryside and a Five-Anti Campaign in the cities. Mao stressed that the purpose of the Socialist Education Movement was to oppose and prevent revisionism and that, only by launching the movement, could revisionism be stopped in China.\(^\text{77}\) He made copies of the Hunan and Hebei reports on socialist education and required other provinces to learn from their experiences in order to carry out the movement quickly. Mao believed that China's rural areas had been controlled and ruled by corrupt local cadres. Therefore, in the Socialist Education Movement a four-point clean-up campaign was initiated, focusing on cleaning up the management of accounts, granaries, property, and work points. The urban Five-Anti Campaign targets included graft and embezzlement, speculative activities, extravagance, dispersionism, and bureaucracy.

In order to speed up the pace of the movement, Mao convened another meeting at Hangzhou in May. Mao was unhappy about regional leaders' lack of enthusiasm for his call for class struggle to deal with the danger of revisionism. He complained that 'not
only foreign revisionists but also domestic capitalists do not acknowledge the existence of classes and class struggles. We have many cadres and Party members who have an inadequate understanding of the seriousness of the enemy situation. Mao’s remarks were not only a warning to local leaders but also an indication that many leaders were not in complete agreement with Mao’s mindset.

The May meeting produced the ‘Draft resolution of the CCP CC on some problems in current rural work’, also known as the Earlier Ten Points. The meeting estimated that there ‘emerged serious and sharp class struggles’ in the Chinese society and proclaimed that ‘class struggles should never be forgotten’. The Earlier Ten Points document cited Mao’s remarks to emphasise the importance of the movement:

The Socialist Education Movement is a great revolutionary movement . . . This is a struggle that calls for the re-education of man. This is a struggle for reorganising the revolutionary class armies for a confrontation with the forces of feudalism and capitalism which are now feverishly attacking us. We must nip their counter-revolution in the bud.

From the Hangzhou meeting in May to September, the Five-Anti Campaign was carried out in the central party and government agencies. The Socialist Education Movement was also carried out at various experimental sites across China. As the movement progressed, more and more people were alleged to be anti-socialist and acted against, and many CCP leaders, particularly Mao, believed that the class situation was becoming progressively worse. In June 1963, just months after the movement got under way, Mao noted that political power at one-third of the basic-level governments had been usurped by bad elements. On 4 June 1964, after serious struggles had been waged against various class enemies, Mao told North Korean visitors that almost a third of the production teams in the rural areas were still controlled by the enemies and their allies. He even mentioned that, throughout China, there were as many as 10 million ‘underground’ bad people.

Sino-Soviet relations in 1963: intensification of polemics and failed talks

From November 1962 to January 1963, five communist parties – in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and East Germany – held their national congresses. At these congresses, Albania became the main target of criticism. China was also criticised. Even though the Chinese knew that fewer parties criticised China than during the 1960 Moscow conference, the CCP leadership took an aggressive position in fighting back against the accusations, a very different position from 1960 when Beijing simply ignored criticisms from communist parties other than the Soviet Union’s.

This round of criticism against the CCP was largely encouraged by Moscow and prompted by China’s severe accusations of Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many of the communist leaders in these countries were also critical of China’s military actions against India in the October border disputes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Beijing launched a massive propaganda campaign to support the Cuban people’s anti-Americanism. In the meantime, Beijing severely criticised Khrushchev for first
adventurism, then capitulating to American imperialism by withdrawing nuclear missiles from Cuba.85 By criticising the Soviet handling of the crisis, the CCP leaders may have mainly intended to defend their own more radical interpretation of the international situation and their international postures, but what they probably failed to fully understand was the political and ideological challenge and even threat to Khrushchev in his own domestic context. The Soviet leaders were bound to fight back if they cared about the legitimacy of their own domestic and international programmes. Thus, a vicious circle of the ideological dilemma was set in motion.

The criticisms of the CCP at the Congresses of the five European communist parties, no matter how veiled they were, gave Mao an excuse to launch a new round of polemics against his ideological foes in Moscow. Chinese participants at the congresses launched a tit-for-tat rhetorical war against their critics and opponents. In a meeting with a Japanese communist leader, Mao made this point clearly: ‘The Italian communist leader Togliatti did a good thing. Had he not openly attacked us, we would have no excuse to reply openly. Now we are bound to respond.’86 Fighting the ideological dissidents in Moscow and other parties was not the only or the primary goal for Mao. During the 10th Plenum, Mao preached loudly the struggles against class enemies to remind people of the possibility of China becoming revisionist. Mao had long run out of patience with a reconciliatory policy toward the Khrushchevites. He concluded that failing to repulse international revisionists would not only lead the international communist movement astray but, more importantly, spoil the growth of revisionism in China. Clearly, after the 10th Plenum, opposing revisionism internationally and preventing revisionism domestically had become two inseparable tasks on Mao’s political agenda.

On 6 January 1963, the CCP Central Committee issued an internal directive that said the struggles between the two lines in the international communist movement had entered a new phase and that China should make full use of the current advantageous situation to win over leftist factions and middle-of-the-road comrades. As for the provocations of the rightists, the CCP should not ignore them, as it had done before, but instead struggle with them tit-for-tat and never compromise.87 From mid-December 1962, Mao, staying out of Beijing, personally supervised the polemics. The People’s Daily and the Red Flag published a total of seven long editorials, which, under the guise of responding to criticisms of other communist leaders, systematically criticised the Soviet positions on war and peace, the nature of imperialism, peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, and sources of modern revisionism. Mao spent a good deal of time supervising the writing of these commentaries. His eagerness to initiate these attacks was clearly illustrated in the comments he wrote on the draft editorial entitled ‘Again on Our Differences with Comrade Togliatti’. Mao commented, ‘Since this time they directly provoked open polemics with us, what can we do? Should [we] keep silent as we did before? . . . No, no, no. We should absolutely reply’.88

Starting from early 1963, Chinese embassies throughout the world carried out an aggressive campaign to disseminate materials aimed at counter-revisionism. The Chinese embassy in Moscow sent a series of cables detailing the number of counter-revisionism brochures disseminated, the recipients of those brochures, Chinese methods in
distributing the materials, and the responses from the readers. Up to May 1963, the Chinese embassy in Moscow had distributed over 5000 copies of counter-revisionism brochures in Russian, Vietnamese, Spanish, French, and English. Chinese diplomats, students, and scholars in the Soviet Union were all involved in this work. Readers included people from other fraternal parties and countries, the developing world, foreign journalists, and local Soviets. The Chinese embassy in Moscow continuously reported to Beijing that the dissemination of these materials had a significant impact on the struggle with the revisionists. These reports are imbued with statements from readers that lavishly praise the CCP and denounce the Soviet leadership, particularly Khrushchev. For instance, one of these cables notes that some local Soviet readers regarded these brochures as ‘treasures’ and eagerly read them. The cable cites one Soviet military officer as saying, ‘Now my mind is clear after reading the counter-revisionism brochures. The CCP has the deepest understanding of Marxism and Leninism. Now the CCP boasts the highest level of Marxism and Leninism. Mao Zedong is the greatest Marxist and Leninist.’89 Despite the Soviet complaints and measures of restrictions, the Chinese embassy continued to make great efforts in disseminating these counter-revisionism materials even after the bilateral party-to-party talks later in 1963. Similar initiatives were undertaken by Chinese embassies in many other countries, including Somalia, Ghana, and Mongolia.90 The Chinese diplomats may have excessively exaggerated the impact of these Chinese brochures, but the political and ideological challenge to Khrushchev and his cohorts was not to be neglected. In fact, Moscow took quite harsh diplomatic measures against the Chinese.91

In this political atmosphere, it became inevitable that all interactions with the Soviets were shadowed by the ideological confrontation between the two parties. In January 1963, the Chinese Foreign Cultural Liaison Commission noted in a report that, since 1962, the Soviet revisionist clique had pursued a very sinister approach in Sino-Soviet cultural relations. The Soviets attempted to do everything possible to limit China’s growing influence. Thus, the cultural relations between the two countries were no longer cultural cooperation between socialist countries but serious struggles between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.92 The Sino-Soviet trade negotiations for 1963 were significantly marred by ‘the context of sharp struggles with modern revisionism’, and it took five months for the trade deal to be concluded.93

Just as Mao was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive against Moscow, Khrushchev again attempted to play down the conflict with China. In a meeting with the new Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Pan Zhili, on 3 January 1963, Khrushchev urged China to stop the polemics and mutual accusations. He said that he thought favourable conditions were emerging for an improvement in bilateral relations by the beginning of 1962, but unfortunately the ties worsened by mid-year. Khrushchev also said that the Soviet Union would attempt to do everything possible to eliminate the differences and restore relations with the CCP to those of several years earlier. And he recalled that, in 1954, Mao asked him how to maintain world peace for five years. He also recalled another conversation with Mao during the Moscow conference in 1957 when Mao demonstrated unease at the possibility that peace could not be maintained and noted that, in response to
Soviet involvement in the crisis in the Middle East, Mao had asked Khrushchev, ‘Do you want war? Don’t fight!’

The CPSU leadership sent a letter to the CCP Central Committee and Mao on 21 February and asked for an end to open polemics. The Soviet letter also proposed holding high-level consultations between the two parties. However, the Soviet request was probably doomed from the start. The letter arrived during the CCP Central Committee work conference, when Mao was pushing hard for a nationwide Socialist Education Movement in the countryside and the Five-Anti Campaign in the cities. Mao’s outright refusal of the Soviet request was, in this context, understandable. During the conference, a CCP Politburo meeting decided to continue to write all the planned editorials, and after that various pamphlets would be published to explain the CCP’s positions on the fundamental principles of Marxism in philosophy, political economy, socialism, international workers’ movements, and national liberation movements. The meeting stressed that efforts should be made to reinforce propaganda toward the outside world. The most important task, according to the Politburo meeting, was to prevent the growth of revisionism at home, which could be helped by the struggles with revisionists on the international front. This meeting reviewed China’s anti-revisionism struggles in the previous period and proposed new principles, tactics, and steps for the next stage of struggles. As a result, the CCP Central Committee decided to formally organise a team of theoreticians to draft documents to help it with opposing revisionism activities. Members of the team included leading cadres in the media, the CCP Propaganda department, the CCP International Department, and the Foreign Ministry. Major articles and documents in the polemics with the Soviets in the subsequent years were all drafted by this team, which continued to exist until the eve of the Cultural Revolution.

Two days later, in a meeting with Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, Mao accused Khrushchev of playing tricks by requesting a stop to polemics on the one hand and openly criticising the Chinese party on the other. Mao insisted that Khrushchev should come to China for the talks, a position that the 9 March Chinese letter of official reply also repeated. Mao agreed to hold talks but refused to stop the polemics. In a near-monologue, he told the Soviet ambassador Chervonenko:

You may attack us. We also have the right to reply and debate. . . . Can’t you perhaps do the same as what we did, publish the other’s articles and then comment? Is it bad to have open polemics? In my view, [if we] have this kind of open polemics, the heaven will not collapse, the grass continues to grow, women will still give birth, and fish in the river will swim as they always do.

Leaders of other socialist countries feared the rupture between Beijing and Moscow and tried to mediate, including the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, who had always maintained a closer ideological stance with the CCP leaders. The CCP leaders felt unhappy about their mediation efforts, complaining that they confuse right and wrong and care about unity at the expense of principle.

Mao’s preparedness to turn on the offensive was well illustrated in some of the poems he wrote in early 1963. One of the poems ends with these lines: ‘The Four Seas are
rising, clouds and waters raging; the five continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring. Away with all pests! Our force is irresistible.\(^{98}\)

Before the Chinese letter of 9 March was sent to the Soviets, the Chinese leadership held a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on 7 March, presided over by Mao, and a Politburo meeting the next day, presided over by Liu, in order to revise and approve the letter. During the two meetings, the Chinese leaders also reviewed the results of anti-revisionism activities in the previous period. They concluded that they had succeeded in repelling the Soviet anti-China campaign and in elaborating China’s positions and views on major issues. The Chinese editorials and commentaries, with regard to either specific policies or theories, upheld the flag of Marxism and Leninism and struck at the main target: the Soviet clique. The Chinese polemics encouraged the left-wing faction, won over the middle faction, and promoted independent thinking among many fraternal parties. Participants of the two meetings also stressed that the polemics were a good opportunity to educate the Chinese people: ‘These articles applied the fundamental principles of Marxism and Leninism, analysed major problems in contemporary international communist movement, armed the whole Party ideologically, and enabled the whole people to know what’s correct and what’s wrong.’\(^{99}\)

The meetings also addressed Chinese tactics in the upcoming Sino-Soviet talks. Chinese leaders believed that Khrushchev faced an awkward situation in which he had to agree to hold talks – otherwise, he would not be able to explain to other fraternal parties – but at the same time, he did not want to retreat from his principled positions. The Chinese approach to the talks, according to decisions made in the two meetings, would be making some concessions on matters irrelevant to principles in order to avoid rupture. If no agreement could be reached, the Chinese were prepared to re-start the polemics and criticise the Soviets even more harshly.\(^{100}\)

The Soviets replied to the Chinese letter on 30 March and again invited Mao to visit Moscow. The reason they gave was a diplomatic one: Khrushchev had visited Beijing three times as compared to Mao visiting Moscow only twice, and Mao had long expressed his desire to visit the Soviet Union. The Soviet reply of 30 March was not just a confirmation of the upcoming talks but a systematic elaboration of the general Soviet line regarding international communism. The document proposed that the Soviet political lines of the 20th and 22nd congresses should be accepted as the general line in the international communist movement. These included peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and a world order without arms, armies, and wars.

At the suggestion of Deng Xiaoping, Mao decided to prepare a comprehensive rebuttal to the Soviet letter of 30 March. Mao instructed the anti-revisionism drafting team and Chen Boda, separately, to prepare the document. At the very beginning, Mao told the writers of the document that it would be published and had to be extremely aggressive (feng mang bi lu).\(^{101}\) The two drafts were discussed at length during the May Hangzhou meeting, which focused on opposing and preventing revisionism. The fact that Mao combined the drafting of the Earlier Ten Points and the reply letter to the Soviets indicated that Mao regarded international and domestic anti-revisionism activities as two parts of one programme. After lengthy discussion and hammering,
a final document was produced and was presented to leaders of the communist parties of New Zealand, North Korea, and Vietnam for comments. The document was finalised and approved by the CCP Politburo in June. Mao changed the original title of the letter from ‘A Reply to the CPSU CC 30 March Letter’ to ‘A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement’ in order to make clear China’s positions on major issues in the upcoming talks. The Proposal was also intended to encourage other fraternal parties to consider the Chinese position. The Chinese document denounced the Soviet line as a deviation from orthodox Marxism and Leninism and systematically made clear China’s views on issues concerning major contradictions in the world, relations in the socialist camp, policy towards the US, support to third world revolutions, war and peace, disarmament, and peaceful transition. The article contained 25 major topics of discussion, so it was also known as the ‘25 Points’. To the further irritation of Khrushchev, on 17 June the People’s Daily published the Chinese Proposal and openly urged Moscow to publish it in the Soviet press as well.

The Chinese took great pains to prepare this document. According to one participant in the writing process, materials with as much as 4 million words were collected in order to write this proposal. Chinese diplomats and students in the Soviet Union took an aggressive role in distributing the Chinese document, and some of them were expelled from the Soviet Union. In fact, the cabinet in front of the Chinese embassy in Moscow displaying Chinese materials advocating Chinese views on Sino-Soviet polemics was smashed by the Soviets. These events caused strong protests from China, and the Chinese government held grand welcoming ceremonies in Beijing for those evicted by the Soviets. According to a cable dated 18 June 1963, which the Chinese embassy in Moscow sent to Beijing, Moscow had moved opposition to China and Marxism-Leninism to centre stage. The cable notes that China’s forceful counter-attacks since the spring had further weakened the Khrushchev revisionist clique and expanded the influence of genuine Marxist and Leninist forces in the international communist movement. It further indicated that Moscow’s proposal for bilateral party talks in February was only a cloak aimed at keeping the polemics ‘internal’ in order to prepare for the next round of struggles with China.

On 26 June and thereafter, Mao convened three Politburo Standing Committee meetings to discuss Chinese strategies in the planned Sino-Soviet talks. In light of the strong Soviet reactions to the Chinese proposal, Chinese leaders realised that the talks would be a fierce challenge. Participants in the meeting agreed that, if the Soviets stopped the polemics, the Chinese delegation would demand a fair agreement in which the Soviets acknowledged that they had been wrong. Mao personally stated that the CCP was now launching an offensive and forcing the Soviets into a defensive position, which was advantageous to the Chinese side. Mao directed that the basic approach of the Chinese delegation should be sticking to principles, going all out to counter-attack, desiring no agreement, but refraining from complete rupture.

At the time when the Chinese leadership was planning to be tough with the Soviets, Khrushchev also had his political confidence shored up after mending fences with the
Cubans in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, showing his intransigence towards the West, and cracking down on domestic ‘bourgeois’ liberalism in arts circles. The Soviet leaders decided to confront the Chinese ideological challenge. The Chinese ‘25 points’ added to the Soviet urgency to get tough with Beijing. Even before the talks started, Beijing and Moscow continued to issue protests and statements against each other. In this tense ongoing diplomatic war, the Chinese delegation led by Deng Xiaoping set off for Moscow on 5 July. As soon as the two delegations met for the talks it became obvious that they had almost no common ground. The whole process was simply a ‘dialogue between two deaf persons’. From the very first meeting, each side simply reiterated its views and refuted the position of the other. A typical session would be one side reading a statement that had been prepared in advance and having it translated, and the session would be over. During the next session, the other side would do the same. On 14 July, with the talks still going on, the Soviets published an open letter to all Soviet communists. The letter answered the Chinese Proposal point by point. According to Georgii Arbatov, a Soviet participant in the Sino-Soviet polemic and a former senior official in charge of relations with other fraternal parties, Soviet leaders intended to use these anti-Chinese documents for their own domestic political purposes – notably as a means of expressing anti-Stalinist views. Arbatov recalls: ‘I must say that the talks and the Soviet Open Letter provided a very real opportunity to reinforce the course set by the 20th Party Congress. And some of the Central Committee Secretaries (Andropov above all), the consultants, and the advisors at the talks did everything in their power to take advantage of it. I think we all felt the weight of the moment and understood how important it was to consolidate the counter-offensive that had begun with the Chinese letter’. This is clear evidence that the ideological dilemma also worked on the Soviet side.

The talks ended without any substantive agreement. In their final discussion about the communique of the meeting, the Soviets proposed to include the following: ‘The talks were conducted in a friendly and comradely atmosphere; the two parties concurred to stop the open polemics’. This was routine practice from 1959, when the two sides had disagreements that they would try to cover up before the rest of the world. However, this time the Chinese disagreed with this practice. Because of the Chinese insistence, the first sentence was changed to ‘During the talks, the two sides expounded their respective positions and views on a range of fundamental principles and issues concerning the development of the contemporary world, the international communist movement, and Sino-Soviet relations’. The Soviet’s second sentence was simply dropped. The only agreement the two sides reached at the end of the talks was to continue to hold talks in the future.

At the farewell banquet held for the Chinese delegation, Khrushchev wanted to downplay the differences between the two parties but was reprimanded by Deng Xiaoping. At the reception, Deng Xiaoping said that the differences between China and the Soviet Union were very grave and profound but also emphasised that the two countries should be reunited. In response to Deng’s remarks, Khrushchev said there were really no profound differences, let alone insurmountable differences. He elaborated by saying that both parties were opposed to and annihilated the


capitalist and landlord classes and colonialism in favour of socialism and both supported Cuba and Indonesia: ‘Look, how can we say the differences are profound? No, differences are imagined. In fact, there is no major difference at all’. When Deng said that he disagreed with Khrushchev, Khrushchev again stressed that the differences were imagined and there was no difference. This conversation clearly shows that the Soviet side wanted to downplay the dispute and was attempting to pursue some kind of reconciliation with the CCP.

Upon arriving back in Beijing, Mao led all senior Chinese leaders together with over 5000 cadres and people from Beijing to welcome the delegation at the airport, a clear indication that Mao approved the delegation’s hard-line approach during the talks. It was a political demonstration particularly against the Soviet revisionists, according to a senior member of the delegation. Mao was happy with the result. He indicated at the meeting he immediately had with the delegation that it had achieved complete victory because it did not reach any agreement with the Soviets that would be contrary to Chinese principles.

In a cable dated 29 July, the Chinese embassy in Moscow noted that the Khrushchev revisionist clique had intensified anti-China rhetoric in the Soviet media after the talks between the two parties. Moscow had speeded up its efforts to placate the US, unite with India, and engage with Yugoslavia in order to oppose China, oppose communism, and oppose revolutions. Another cable dated 16 August reported that Khrushchev again had launched a new wave of anti-China activities. The cable noted that the Soviet media began to attack Mao and Zhou by name. The Soviet media also attacked China’s ‘Three Red Flags’ and the failures of the Great Leap Forward. In yet another cable dated 27 August, the Chinese embassy reported that Moscow had launched a frenetic anti-China movement. Moscow had labelled the positions of the Chinese leaders as being close to a betrayal of communism and the working class, including the Chinese workers, and it had accused Chinese leaders of moving away from Marxism and having a conspiracy to split the international communist movement and destroy the influence of the Soviet party.

In August, a Chinese Foreign Ministry policy report suggested that China should pursue Sino-Soviet relations aggressively. These suggestions included not blocking the other country’s political information in the media and public speeches and the expansion of economic ties and cooperation on new technologies and industrial equipment. The document mentions that some untenable items should be added to the proposal so that the Soviets could not agree to the proposal and China could then criticise Moscow for lacking sincerity on improving ties with China. This seemingly smart tactic was evidence that Beijing had no intention at all to allay the polemics with the Soviets. It was also ironic given the fact that Chinese diplomats had reported on Khrushchev’s conciliatory gestures but simply dismissed them as hypocritical. The Chinese government decided on grand celebrations for the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, given that the counter-revisionism struggles were even more prominent and complicated. Chinese media were instructed to talk about Soviet achievements only in general terms. No mention was to be made of the leadership of
the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government, and no mention was to be made of the achievements in recent years or Soviet assistance to China.\textsuperscript{116}

A report by the Chinese embassy in Moscow indicates that Chinese diplomats and other nationals took an even more aggressive approach in propagating Chinese views on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The document boasts that the embassy had distributed over 5000 copies of the CCP’s 14 June letter of reply to the Soviet party and over 10,000 copies of various counter-revisionism articles and brochures, had presented over 3000 copies of \textit{Beijing Weekly} and \textit{China Construction} journals and nearly 20,000 copies of various kinds of temporary propaganda materials, and had published 12 news briefs and 13 news bulletin boards. The embassy concluded that all the achievements were made through strenuous efforts by many Chinese in the Soviet Union, despite strong resistance and counter-measures by the Soviet authorities. The same report notes that, in September and October, on several occasions Khrushchev appealed to China to stop the polemics, but the Chinese embassy concluded that his appeal was disingenuous and a result of China’s severe ideological attacks and the rising problems in the Soviet Union. This report notes that China’s commentaries in response to the Soviet ‘open letter’ profoundly and forcefully disclosed the Soviet betrayal of Marxism and Leninism, abandonment of proletarian internationalism, the counter-revolution, and the ugly face of the Soviet leadership acting as the defenders of imperialism and colonialism.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Conclusions}

This paper has systematically analysed the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations from the relative moderation and stability of 1960 to July 1962, including the efforts by various Chinese leaders to refocus the momentum of bilateral relations back on a normal track, the deterioration of relations beginning in August 1962, and Beijing’s aggressive and hard-line approach to the Soviet leadership in the subsequent year that resulted in the failure of the party-to-party talks in July 1963. This article has provided detailed descriptions of China’s internal assessments of the Sino-Soviet relations at every major juncture and the evolution of bilateral relations from relative stability to increasing tensions.

As this paper reveals, changing dynamics in the Sino-Soviet relations were closely related to developments in China’s domestic politics. Especially, Mao’s attitude towards and priorities for the domestic political economy played a crucial role in shaping China’s policy towards the Soviet Union. This paper also contributes to our understanding of the policy differences between Mao and other more moderate Chinese leaders in early 1962 when Sino-Soviet relations were at a critical juncture. Previous studies have almost exclusively focused on Wang Jiaxiang and his different foreign policy proposals. But this study reveals that policy differences among the CCP leadership were far more profound. Many of those moderate Chinese leaders were sincerely opposed to an excessively aggressive policy towards Moscow and attempted to stabilise and improve ties with Moscow in the early months of 1962. They made the attempt in the overall domestic context of economic retrenchment and political relaxation.
This paper has provided a detailed account of how the transformation of China’s domestic politics has been closely related to the changing dynamics in the Sino-Soviet relations. No other factor explains the abrupt reversal of Beijing’s approach to the Soviet Union in summer 1962 better than the domestic politics in China. Beginning in summer 1962, Mao realised that he was increasingly losing political power and policy influence. He began to stage a political comeback. His resentment of the domestic political and economic developments, as exemplified at the Beidaihe meeting and the 10th Plenum, completely changed the political atmosphere in China. China’s foreign policy, especially relations with the Soviet Union, was inevitably clouded by the pervasive ‘class struggle’ milieu in China. After the two meetings, Mao used his political authority and power to push for further radicalisation of China’s politics and linked his rivals in Moscow to his domestic political problems. Countering the Soviet revisionism became part of Mao’s political agenda of preventing the Chinese polity from degenerating into political and ideological revisionism. The danger of the CCP being infected with the revisionist disease, as Mao perceived it, rested with those Chinese leaders who had attempted to reverse his radical domestic programs. His political comeback in late 1962 and his subsequent efforts in pushing for the Socialist Education Movement were intended to keep his radical programmes on track and at the same time to check the power and influence of his political rivals within the party. Using the ideological struggle with Moscow served Mao’s purposes.

The article has further analysed the causal mechanisms between China’s domestic politics and Beijing’s Soviet policy by developing the concept of an ideological dilemma. The deterioration of relations between Beijing and Moscow was perhaps inevitable because of the ideological dilemma. Once the domestic priority became class struggle and preventing revisionism, China could not go along with the Soviet ideological framework that emphasised peaceful coexistence with the Western capitalist countries and domestic political moderation. It would have been impossible for Mao to justify such divergence. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership had been critical of Mao’s radical programmes ever since the late 1950s. Criticising the Soviet political and ideological platform helped Mao to claim that he was actually practising orthodox Marxism and genuine socialism and to maintain the legitimacy of his radical programmes in the domestic context.

Obviously, the ideological dilemma worked in interaction. As demonstrated in this paper, any rhetoric or move by one side that was essentially intended to defend its own position was regarded by the other as a challenge to its own domestic ideological and political programmes. This vicious circle engendered the deterioration of relations between Beijing and Moscow. On the part of China, in many instances, Mao clearly used the ideological differences with Moscow and the Soviet Union as a negative example to push for his domestic political programmes and achieve victory in domestic political struggles, which further aggravated the negative consequences of the ideological dilemma. The mutual rhetorical recriminations in 1963 and the failed party-to-party talks in July created an openly hostile atmosphere in the relations.
between Beijing and Moscow and paved the way for the initiation of a period of even more detrimental polemics from September 1963 to July 1964.

Notes

[15] CFMDD, no. 109-03008-01; ‘Sulian baokan dui wo guo qingkuang de baodao’ [Soviet media reports about China’s conditions].
[17] CFMDD, no. 117-01530-02; ‘Zhongyang guanyu zhong su youhao tiaoyue shi yi zhou nian qingzhu banfa zhishi’ [Central instructions on how to celebrate the 11th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty].
[19] Ibid., 385.
[23] CFMDD, no. 109-03008-01; ‘Sulian baokan dui wo guo qingkuang de baodao’ [Soviet media reports about China’s conditions].


[26] Liu, Eight years of Diplomatic Mission in the Soviet Union, 139

[27] CFMDD, no. 109-03190-02: ‘Guanyu zhong su keji hezuo di shi er jie huiyi shi’ [Matters relating to Sino-Soviet 12th meeting in science and technological cooperation].

[28] Liu, Eight Years of Diplomatic Mission in the Soviet Union, 162.

[29] CFMDD, no. 109-03801-01; ‘Chen Yi fu zhongli zai waijiaobu dangweihui dui zhu sulian dashi Liu Xiao guanyu zhu su shiguan gongzuo huihao su zuo de zhishi’ [Instructions by Vice Premier Chen Yi at the Foreign Ministry party committee meeting in response to Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union Liu Xiao’s report on the work of Chinese embassy in the Soviet Union].

[30] CFMDD, no. 109-03795-01; ‘Zhongyang youguan fandui xiandai xiuzhengzhuyi he chuli tong sulian deng guo guanxi fangmian de jig e wenti de zhishi’ [Central instructions on several issues in opposing modern revisionism and handling relations with Soviet Union and other countries].


[33] The case of Wang Jiaxiang has been discussed extensively by other scholars. See for example Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 212–3; Niu, ‘1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy’.

[34] Editorial team for selected works of Wang Jiaxiang, ed., Remembering Wang Jiaxiang.


[38] Jin, Biography of Zhou Enlai, 675.


[40] Mao made this comment in a meeting with a military delegation from Albania on 3 February 1967. Mao told the Albanian visitors that he had discerned the problem as early as January 1962 at the 7000-cadre conference. Mao also mentioned the rightist tendency of 1962 in his big character poster ‘Bombard the Headquarter’ in early August 1966.


[44] Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, 189


[47] Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, 190–1

[48] Ibid., 192.

[49] CCP CC Documents Research Institute, Selected Important Documents since the Founding of PRC, vol. 15, 652–3.

[50] CCP CC Documents Research Institute, Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, vol. 10, 188–9.


[57] CFMDD, no. 118-01771-04: ‘Zhongyang guanyu chuzhi xinjiang wai tao he wai tao huilai renyuan wenti de zhishi’ [Party centre’s instructions regarding how to handle those who fled out and those who came back gain].

[58] CFMDD, no. 118-01123-01: ‘Guanyu zai zhong su bianjing zhankai fan xiuzheng zhuyi dianfu pohuai douzheng de qingkuang he cuoshi’ [Situation and measures in the struggles of opposing revisionism on Sino-Soviet borders].

[59] CFMDD, no. 118-01099-04: ‘Xinjiang zizhiqiu dangwei guanyu Xiang ganbu he qunzhong shenru jinxing fan xiuzhengzhuyi jiaoyu de qingshi baogao’ [Xinjiang autonomous region party committee’s report regarding carrying out in-depth counter-revisionism education among cadres and masses].

[60] CFMDD, no. 109-02423-01: ‘Zui jin su dui wo de yixie zuofa’ [Soviet recent approach to us].

[61] CFMDD, no. 109-02423-01: ‘Dui su xingshi he fan xiu douzheng de yixie kanfa yu tihui’ [Some views on the Soviet situation and counter-revisionism].


[63] CFMDD, no. 109-03213-02: ‘Su fang dui wo guoqing de qingzhu qingkuang’ [Soviet celebration of China’s national day].

[64] Liu, Eight Years of Diplomatic Mission in the Soviet Union, 146–8.

[65] CFMDD, no. 109-03809-06: ‘Zhu su dashi Liu Xiao xiang He cixing baihui tanhua neiromg’ [Conversation record of ambassador Liu Xiao’s farewell meeting with Khrushchev].


[69] CFMDD, no. 109-03809-06: [Conversation record of ambassador Liu Xiao’s farewell meeting with Khrushchev].


[71] Xiao et al., Exploring China: Ten-Year History Prior to the Cultural Revolution, 936.


[73] Xiao et al., Exploring China: The Ten-Year History Prior to the Cultural Revolution, 996.

[74] Ibid., 997.

[75] Ibid., 1000.


[77] Bo, Retrospection on Major Decision-making and Events, 1142–70.

[79] CCP CC Documents Research Institute, Selected Important Documents since the Founding of PRC, vol. 16, 315–6.
[81] Bo, Retrospection on Major Decision-making and Events, 1116.
[82] Cao, Special Villa: The Red Wall outside the Red Wall, 268–70.
[83] Wu, A Decade of Polemics, 533.
[84] For detailed discussions of these events, see Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 228–36.
[87] Ibid., 977.
[88] The CCP CC Documents Research Institute, Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, vol. 10, 246–54.
[90] CFMDD, no. 109-02553-01: ‘Zhu sulian shiguan he qita yixie zhu wai shiguan sanfa fan xiu xiao cezi de qingkuang’ [Chinese embassies in the Soviet Union and other countries disseminating counter-revisionism brochures].
[95] Wu, A Decade of Polemics, 539–41.
[96] Ibid., 545–6; for the Russian archive of this conversation, see Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 50–1.
[99] Wu, A Decade of Polemics, 552–4.
[100] Ibid., 555.
[103] CFMDD, no. 109-02560-04: ‘Sulian zai zhong su liang dang huitan qianhou de fan hua qingkuang’ [Soviet anti-China actions around the talks between the two parties].
[106] Ibid., 60.
[110] Ibid., 621.
[111] CFMDD, no. 109-03839-09: ‘Su gong zhongyang zhuxi tuan yan qing zhonggong daibiaotuan shi de tanhua jilu’ [Conversation record at the banquet hosted by the Soviet party central committee presidium for the CCP delegation].
[113] Wu, A Decade of Polemics, 623.
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CFMDD, no. 109-02560-04: ‘Sulian zai zhong su liang dang huitan qianhou de fan hua qingkuang’ [Soviet anti-China actions around the talks between the two parties].

CFMDD, no. 109-02562-04: ‘Waijiaobu guanyu zhong su guojia guanxi fangmian zhankai gongshi de jianyi de chugao’ [Draft suggestions of the Foreign Ministry on launching an offensive in Sino-Soviet relations].

CFMDD, no. 109-02561-01: ‘Waijiaobu, duiwai wen wei guanyu shi yue geming si shi liu zhournian qingzhu banfa de qingshi baogao’ [Foreign Ministry and Commission on Foreign Cultural Exchanges joint proposal on celebration of the 46th anniversary of the October Revolution].


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